Beyond three states of British foreign policy

INTRODUCTION

British foreign policy is caught in a doom loop. Successive governments have pursued a strategy of passive triangulation between the United States, the European Union, and the rest of the world. This triangulation allows policymakers the comfort and complacency of not having to confront difficult trade-offs or harsh realities. It is also forcing the United Kingdom to oscillate between three un-rewarding roles: a tributary state to the United States; a supplicant state to multilateral institutions; and a mercenary state which could be accused of having jettisoned its values. None of these states represent a viable long-term role for the UK. 

In the first eighteen months of Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labour government, former Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s ‘progressive realism’ concept struggled to deliver a balanced and intentional foreign policy approach. The concept becomes slippery when crisis response - in the face of, say, US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, President Donald Trump’s tariff diplomacy or Israel’s war on Gaza - is not informed by a guiding strategic vision. What constitutes the UK’s national interest? And how can a sharper sense of this interest provide a framework for how the UK responds to crisis and upheaval abroad? In what follows, we offer one possible guiding strategy for UK foreign policy based on the pursuit of national resilience, which avoids the pitfalls of the ‘three states’ paradigm and which bolsters the nation’s national and economic security without sacrificing its values. 

THE WORLD WE FACE

In 2025, Crisis Group predicted that the world’s “slide into lawlessness looks set to continue”. Events since then have proven them right. From the shattered streets of Gaza City to the shores of Venezuela and the currently closed Strait of Hormuz, states have used violence to further their foreign policy goals and extract domestic political gains with scant regard to international law or the post-1945 multilateral institutions. War rages across the Middle East - and in Sudan, Myanmar, Ukraine and beyond - with little prospect of achieving lasting peace. In the past year alone, longstanding rivalries between the likes of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, or Israel and Iran have sparked into new open conflicts.

Authoritarian powers like Russia and China seek to redraw global borders through a combination of hard power and hybrid interference, insisting that their efforts are internal matters and nothing to do with the international community. Under President Trump, the United States is doing little to discourage them, and has reasserted 19th century visions of American power in the western hemisphere as well as another costly war in the Middle East. The United States and China both pursue strategic decoupling from the other in terms of trade and supply chains, with the former desperate for its closest allies (including the UK) to follow suit as it raises tariffs and seeks to create its own preferential trading and investment system. At the same time the pre-existing global trading system is fragmenting, with rising protectionism seen in countries ranging from Brazil to Indonesia. The failure of the World Trade Organization to resolve disputes has led to the rise of regional groups, including the BRICS grouping which are seeking to redirect global trade, ensure a greater voice for countries in the Global South within any new world order, and are even exploring the idea of a new global payments system and currency. The bifurcating effects of emerging technology are driving further division, as the United States and China seek to constrain each other’s technological progress and strong-arm allies into siding with their respective tech companies. 

These disputes transcend the regions they play out in; they affect us all. At the time of writing, the ongoing war in the Middle East between the US/Israeli alliance and Iran has led to much of Asia rationing energy, with oil trading above $100 per barrel and forecasts of higher inflation, increased energy and food prices, and slower economic growth for much of the world in 2026. The impact of Israel’s campaign in Gaza has been felt across communities in the UK, calling into question the effectiveness of international humanitarian law. A future Chinese invasion or embargo of Taiwan risks disrupting $3 trillion worth of investment and trade flows with the global economic fallout predicted to be larger than both the 2008 financial crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, meanwhile, has had a seismic impact on flows of food, energy, finance and more throughout the world, alongside the devastating human cost of their actions. In the age of impunity, accountability for violating humanitarian principles is rare, and perpetrators are more likely to be rewarded diplomatically than chastised. 

Even in relatively peaceful societies, far-right movements are gaining popularity, in thrall to autocrats who reject the rule of law and the legitimacy of institutions, and fuel race-based antipathy to migration. Populists playing into these sentiments have already found electoral successes in Italy, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Finland, and by 2030 could be in government in Germany, France, and the UK. Worryingly, these movements seem increasingly to draw strength from disillusioned younger generations who make up an active part of broad coalitions. 

Increasingly the domestic cannot be separated from the international. As COVID-19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine have demonstrated, a lack of national resilience leaves the UK economy vulnerable to  geopolitical events. The UK Government’s response to these events often requires stark policy trade-offs - prioritizing the immediate crisis at the cost of other national priorities - as was seen in the Johnson Government’s abandonment of levelling up in the face of funding PPE and COVID payments for those laid off from work. This short-termism, while necessary, inevitably drives further polarization as the public grows fatigued by the prospect of further austerity, declining public services, and a general feeling that the country is just managing to keep its head above water. Ultimately, worsening living standards for ordinary citizens can only be borne for so long.  

The British public’s reluctance for the UK to expand its international role while living standards decline at home is evident in the limited support for increasing spending on defence. Pollsters have found that public support for rearmament is dependent on it not being funded by cuts to public spending.

The UK has some tools at its disposal to navigate this landscape, but also a dangerous set of false assumptions. Economically, the UK is not prepared to address foreign policy challenges with the flexibility and confidence that it has conventionally expected of itself. The UK’s debt to GDP ratio (currently at 95.5%) constrains its ability to bounce back from a seismic event. It has finite resources, which over decades have been sold off to cover day-to-day spending. And it can no longer rely on its closest allies for financial support or protection. 

Even setting aside conventional military, economic and political challenges, the UK faces profound and complex choices over the many global transitions taking place in the 21st century. The acceleration of climate change, the emergence of powerful new technologies (for good or bad), and demographic transformations throughout much of ‘the West’ all could be equally as great disruptions as war or economic crisis. Coordinated action across government is required to build the country’s resilience to these coming shocks, coupled with a clear vision to rally a fragmented and apprehensive public. 

THREE STATES OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

The 2025 National Security Strategy published by the Cabinet Office declared the birth of a new era of ‘radical uncertainty’ driven by many of the trends discussed above. As the risks grow and the UK’s relative power diminishes, the UK faces an urgent need to bolster its economic and national security. Such development cannot be achieved merely through the triangulation which has underpinned decades of foreign policy thinking in Whitehall. Winston Churchill is perhaps the most celebrated advocate of this approach, describing the ‘three majestic circles’ of Europe, the Anglo-American Alliance, and the Commonwealth (and the rest of the world). In the immediate wake of the Second World War and for decades after, such thinking saw British governments prioritize the defence and security partnership with the USA, trade with Europe, and pursue differing levels of trade and diplomatic engagement with the rest of the world depending on the priorities of the government of the day. In the ensuing years, geopolitical events have put these arrangements to the test, from Suez and Vietnam to the Iraq War and Brexit. But none of these events ever jolted the UK foreign policy establishment into rethinking its fundamental world view. In the absence of convincing new ideas, the UK’s triangulation strategy has led to it assuming a set of roles which leave much to be desired: becoming a tributary state to the US, a supplicant state to a failing international system, or a mercenary state which has abandoned its core values. 

The tributary state

The UK and by extension the UK public have been one of the primary beneficiaries of US economic, military, and cultural primacy since the end of the Second World War. The UK businessman able to negotiate a deal in a foreign country as a result of English remaining the Lingua-Franca; the banker in the City of London which is the largest offshore clearing hub for US dollars; and the pensioner able to get healthcare free at the point of use because the UK spends less on defence: all have benefited from US hegemony.

Yet, far too many in government today are unwilling to admit that this is the case and reject the idea that the country’s success is closely intertwined with that of our American cousins. The UK’s dependence on the USA in recent years has only grown. The United States in 2023 accounted for nearly a third of all inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This figure is likely to increase as the current government has reduced its ambitions for government-led capital spending and become heavily reliant on private sector investment in infrastructure. The lion’s share of this has come in the form of investments in data centres and a theme park from US-based investors. 

In sectors of the UK economy which constitute key areas of growth, provide significant jobs, and are a significant part of the Government’s industrial strategy, US investment is even higher. This includes the UK creative industries sector where in 2023 the United States accounted for nearly 45% of all FDI, the UK life-sciences sector where North American investors accounted for 33% of series B round funders for UK biotechnology startups, and the UK Artificial Intelligence sector where large technology companies like Meta, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Anthropic in 2023 accounted for 80% of all UK AI revenues. 

The UK’s dependence upon the United States extends into the security domain. Like most European countries, the UK spends, on average, around half of its defence equipment budget on US-made equipment. Around 10,000 US troops are based on UK soil and we work closely with US intelligence organisations as part of the Five Eyes Alliance. The UK has not fought a military conflict without US support since the Sierra Leone civil war in 2000 and remains heavily reliant on the United States for key military capabilities including logistics support, air-to-air refuelling, suppression of enemy defence systems, air defence missiles, F-35 aircraft, cyber defence and offensive operations, and the ongoing maintenance of parts of its nuclear deterrent. Nowhere is Europe’s security reliance on the United States more evident than when it comes to military aid for Ukraine. Even taking into account its recent shift in approach to the conflict, the United States has given five times the amount of military aid to Ukraine compared to Germany and the UK, sixteen times the amount given by Poland, and eighteen times the amount given by France.

With these economic and security dependencies it is not surprising that the current policy of the UK Government has been to keep the United States as close as it can. It is why the UK became the first country to sign an economic and prosperity deal with the second Trump administration, which some have speculated gives Washington a veto over inward foreign investment into the UK. The UK also moved, in line with other NATO countries, to commit to spending 5% of its GDP on defence by 2035, and joined the United States in refusing to sign onto the communique at the recent AI Summit in Paris. 

But the vulnerabilities of this dependency are clear. With the United States adopting all the more challenging foreign policy postures, for instance on Greenland and Iran, the UK is exposed. By aligning completely with US policy, the UK risks complicity with actions that undermine the wider international system. But publicly opposing a US stance on a given issue (as Keir Starmer has done over involvement in the Iran War) leaves us  more open than most to severe punitive shocks in the form of tariffs or political interference. In the age of Trump, the role of ‘tributary state’ offers as many perils as benefits. 

2. The supplicant state

As one of the architects of the post-war international rules based system, the UK has a significant influence in multinational institutions. This includes a seat on the United Nations Security Council, UK judges on the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights, and 4% of global voting rights at the International Monetary Fund. 

This influence may be disproportionate to the UK’s current global standing, but it has brought with it a reverence for multinational institutions which has not always served UK national interests. Nowhere is the conflict between adherence to multinational institutions and national interests on display more than in the deal to hand the Chagos Islands to Mauritius in exchange for a 99 year lease of the Diego Garcia military base. Following an advisory opinion at the International Court of Justice (February 2019) and a non-binding vote at the UN General Assembly (May 2019), the UK has agreed to pay Mauritius £101m a year for the 99 year lease in a deal it describes as a ‘legal necessity’. 

The Chagos deal marks the first time the UK has voluntarily handed over territory since 1997 and could risk opening up the UK to further legal action at the International Court of Justice or the UN General Assembly regarding its other overseas territories, including Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands. At the time of writing, the deal appears on pause following the removal of support from the Trump Administration.

Outside of territorial disputes, there are other areas of trade and foreign policy where the UK has been compelled to make compromises on its national interests because of multinational institutions. Brexit demonstrates this starkly. Both the deal secured by the UK when it left the EU and subsequent agreements to improve on the post-Brexit relationship are underpinned by a dispute agreement which includes the role of the European Court of Justice in UK law. The UK’s adherence to regulations set by EU institutions, over which it has no control or influence, may not necessarily be a bad thing, but it does make the UK particularly susceptible to shifts in political thinking across the EU; progressives may feel differently about this arrangement if EU institutions become captured by the populist right.

A particular point of contention has been the UK’s continued membership of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Historically, the UK does not have a written constitution or a codified bill of rights. Instead, under our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights the UK is obligated to uphold the human rights of everyone under its jurisdiction and, where it fails, individuals can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. Some argue that membership of the ECHR makes UK governments supplicant to its rulings, despite there being notable examples like giving prisoners the right to vote where the Ministers refuse to comply with the court’s rulings. If the UK were to ever leave the ECHR, unless a government introduced primary legislation to codify those rights not covered by existing Common Law, UK citizens could face their civil, political, and human rights being dramatically curtailed.

The UK has benefited for the most part from an open global trading system based on fair and transparent trade. However, we are seeing a new wave of protectionism and bifurcation. The expansion of the WTO post-Cold War and in particular the admittance of China without first requiring it to liberalise its economy and dismantle unfair trade practices has led to the growing trade war we see today between the USA and China. The UK recognises ‘resurgent protectionism’ but there is a risk that, should the USA, China, EU and others abandon adherence to the WTO while retaining membership, they will remain one of the few remaining countries adhering to a free and open trading system that no longer exists. While being an assiduous member of the international rules-based system since its inception has brought considerable benefits to the UK, the increasing contempt with which those rules are treated by stronger powers could leave us clinging to structures that no longer protect our interests. 

The mercenary state

Consecutive governments have sought to deregulate businesses and financial services at home and pushed for free trade agreements with governments of all political stripes abroad in an effort to offset the costs of Brexit. The result has seen the UK gain a reputation for laundering ‘dirty money’ and criticism  that the UK’s trade agenda is divorced from human rights or adherence to the rule of law. This, in essence, is the behaviour of what some might consider a ‘mercenary state’. Such an approach, which includes abandoning values and international norms that have long-protected the UK, would be an act of moral and material self-harm in a changing world where hard power has returned and Britain’s standing has diminished. 

The UK's foreign policy in the 21st century is rooted in remnants of its past global, imperial role and the persistent myth of an ‘island nation’ that stands alone. However, this misty-eyed nostalgia belies the fact our past greatness was built from morally questionable foundations. Whether it is the UK paying reparations to slaveowners as part of the abolition of slavery, its widespread exploitation of colonies for financial gain, or some British elites collaborating openly with the Nazis, there are countless examples that complicate simple narratives about Britain’s global role. 

Since Brexit, many parliamentarians and political commentators have emphasised the need for a transactional and practical foreign policy, recognising that the UK may have limited or few choices on who to partner with. In some ways, the UK has risen to this challenge. It has deepened  trade and investment ties with the People’s Republic of China and the Gulf States, and signed a Free Trade Agreement with India. At the same time, Keir Starmer’s government was first in the queue to secure an agreement with the United States to lower tariffs the Trump Administration imposed on UK goods. It has also agreed with some agility to a series of initiatives designed to promote trade and investment with the EU. 

Despite the inherent promise, it is largely accepted that these agreements fall short of the level of economic growth which the Government has signalled as its main objective. The reestablishment of the UK-China Financial Dialogue saw just £600m of new investment from China announced. The recent trade agreement with India is estimated to contribute an additional £4.6bn a year to the UK’s GDP which is the equivalent of nearly the amount of tax that Premier League football clubs contribute to the Treasury each year and around £3.4bn less than the Premier League contributes annually to the UK economy. Therefore it begs the question whether the trade-offs the UK is making to secure deals with low amounts of growth expected are worthwhile.

At the same time, the Government has found itself caught in a race to the bottom as it slashes red tape and waters down the power of regulators, including reducing the power of shareholders, removing some transparency requirements for companies listing on the London Stock Exchange, and reforming the Senior Managers and Certification Regime which was brought in to regulate culture and accountability following the 2008 Financial Crisis. As above, the commitment to a policy of growth at all costs has meant that the UK has sacrificed many of the values that once meant it could play an influential role in shaping a rules-based order.

The UK Government has noted that our openness to trade and investment leaves the UK exposed to a high level of money laundering. In the past this allowed Russian oligarchs to launder their ill-gotten gains in the City of London and entrench their influence over British politics. Today, that trend continues: the National Crime Agency estimates that £90 billion is laundered annually in the UK.

Years of austerity have hit the UK’s foreign policy capacity hard. In the last three years the number of UK diplomats based in embassies overseas has fallen by 3% and the FCDO has been forced to sell off the UK’s overseas embassies in Bangkok and Tokyo to fund day to day spending. This trend appears unlikely to end, as the FCDO has committed to a 13% reduction in its department administration budget by 2028-2029 as part of the Spending Review (2025) and plans to cut the UK’s Overseas Development Aid (ODA) budget by £4.9bn by 2027. As a result of these pressures and the Government’s widely publicised aim of growth above all else, UK diplomats’ performance will be assessed on their delivery of trade and investment wins overseas, diplomats are required to become patrons of British Chambers of Commerce (which will be used as a shadow diplomatic arm to make up for cuts to the FCDO), and diplomats are being sent on placements at some of the UK’s largest firms, including banks, to help understand their business needs.

In a world of competing powers where traditional partners may no longer be reliable, the UK is presenting itself as a nation to whom values may be a luxury it cannot afford as it seeks to ensure it has growing influence with as many partners as possible. However, the vulnerabilities of this approach include: a further hollowing out of the state’s capacities; an overreliance on multinational companies who are primarily interested in the highest return for their shareholders even if that comes at the cost of the resilience of the UK economy; and the potential weaponisation of dependencies by foreign governments who are committed to the dismantling of democracies and the neutering of the British state. 

BEYOND THREE STATES: THE RENEWAL OF NATIONAL RESILIENCE

None of the states outlined above will serve the UK’s economic and national security interests well into the future. Each is fraught with its own trade-offs: potential benefits but clear weaknesses. But if the UK does not want to continue to be a tributary state of the US, a supplicant to weakening multilateral institutions, or a mercenary state shorn of its values, then what kind of strategy should it adopt?

There are many answers to this question, but we argue that the solution is not to devise a new role (or roles), but to centre the renewal of national resilience and build a foreign policy agenda in the pursuit of that. The three states outlined above lead the UK either towards an unhealthy dependence on foreign sources of power (as tributary or supplicant) or towards dangerous isolation (as mercenary). Our security and economic vulnerabilities cannot be solved overnight, but while starting from this less than ideal position the UK Government must make decisions now to realise a vision of national resilience over the longer term. The following recommendations set out how we think foreign policy in the pursuit of national resilience can be achieved. 

Recommendation One: Set a long-term vision

In the world outlined above, it is understandable that decision-makers in Whitehall may adopt a reactive posture, seeking to maintain some sense of equilibrium and manage events to mitigate the worst consequences. The three states we discussed offer a toolkit to achieve this but, as we have argued, they do nothing to improve our position long-term, and they do not work towards an ultimate vision or goal. The Government and its supporters must set out a vision of what the UK’s global position should be in the coming decades: a vision and position that is rooted in national resilience. What do we want to offer the world? What are the causes that matter most to our own security and prosperity? And what capabilities do we need to develop as a result? Answers to these questions would establish a framework for deciding how to proceed (and prioritise) when faced with more immediate crises.

Recommendation Two: Prioritise cooperation with likeminded middle powers

As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney proclaimed at Davos in early 2026, middle powers face a reckoning in this time of geopolitical upheaval. While buffeted by China and the United States, there remain many opportunities for middle powers to advance their interests as traditional international relations are recast. The UK Government should  seek to develop a consistent partnership with those middle powers that share interests and values, starting with developed democracies. Such a grouping will become even more important if Russia is allowed to rejoin the G7 as part of a peace deal with Ukraine.

An informal alliance could be built around identifying existing international rules and norms which partners are particularly interested in maintaining and defending. Nascent roots of an informal alliance are already taking place. The decision by the UK to time recognition of a Palestinian state with Canada, France, and Australia, even if it lacked a consistent set of criteria for recognition, demonstrated an ability for likeminded middle-powers to work together on a shared foreign policy decision.

Under this approach, the UK should identify those developed democracies that experience the same challenges and share the same values. This would be the core of any informal alliance of middle powers. This could be done under the ‘G7 plus’ format, which would include the G7 countries (minus the United States) plus South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. 

The core group would be supplemented by other middle-powers who share similar interests and the UK can work on a case-by-case basis, this grouping would include the Gulf States, Commonwealth countries, and other developing countries.

Recommendation Three: Adopt a small bet—high risk strategy

The UK will bankrupt itself if it tries to take on superpowers. Instead, it must adopt a small bet high risk strategy which means using its limited economic resources (in terms of capital and research and development spend) to invest in emerging technologies and speculative future industries where the UK has an intrinsic advantage as a result of its universities or preexisting start up environment. For instance, the UK would be far better off investing in developing quantum computing or fusion than seeking to compete with the substantial resources China and the United States are spending on AI.

UK policymakers should be honest with the public about the limited choices the UK has in the short-term, while quietly laying down a strategy in the medium-term to shore up resilience and allow the UK to strengthen its role in the world in fifteen years-time. 

Recommendation Four: Use soft power to attract talent

The UK’s global success has owed much to its ability to produce, attract, and keep talented individuals who, in turn, are willing to create world-leading businesses and art, develop new innovations, or enter into public service. The UK cannot compete with China or the United States when it comes to financial incentives to buy talent. But it can entice talent in other ways. President Trump’s second state visit demonstrated that even the most powerful man in the world is in awe of the British state and its soft power. 

The UK’s soft power goes beyond its world-renowned healthcare, arts industry or sports. The UK should also review and utilise the British honours system to attract and keep talent in the UK, particularly when it comes to those working in strategic sectors that are vital for the UK’s long-term interests. In doing so, it should also consider reframing the system to move it away from the imperial connotations of much of the nomenclature. 

In practice, this could mean potentially expanding skilled visas in areas of emerging technology to attract the best global talent, creating tax incentives for companies that maintain research and development in the UK, and rewarding UK businesses and individuals who make a contribution to UK national interests with honours.

Recommendation Five: Pursue material resilience

Brexit , the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the oil crisis driven by the Iran War all highlighted the vulnerability of the UK supply chains vital for the continued functioning of the state. The UK government must build our resilience in food, energy, arms, and health to reduce our reliance on other countries and allow us to withstand future shocks. This could be pursued by mandating a minimum threshold (percentage) of these supply chains to be based in the UK, a minimum threshold (percentage) of these supply chains to be based in countries that are close partners of the UK, and a ceiling (percentage) for the rest of the supply chain to be based in third-countries.

The UK Chancellor recently announced a new economic security law which will seek to protect the steel and shipbuilding sectors and additional defence spending to meet agreed NATO targets, but the government must go further to shore up the UK’s energy, food, and health supply chain.

Developing resilience does not have to come at the expense of growth. Instead it is complementary to the Government’s growth agenda and will have the added benefit of creating jobs and increasing investment into the UK. This is the case in the green energy sector, where the Government has committed to creating 400,000 new jobs by the end of the parliament as part of efforts to create clean energy independence and the defence sector which has already seen the highest level of defence investment in a decade.

Recommendation Six: Set clearer priorities for the FCDO

British foreign policy is often criticised as being far too broad, with the FCDO’s limited resources stretched across multiple priority areas and nearly every geographic region. This is not helped by the recent domestic political churn which has seen four governments and six foreign secretaries in the last five years bringing with them changing foreign policy priorities. 

The UK Government should go further in clarifying the FCDO’s core priorities and freeing up capacity to focus on the development of a long-term foreign policy strategy. This should include avoiding replicating peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts and recognising conflicts where the UK has genuine influence and resources to bring peace.

Despite development remaining a current priority of the FCDO, it is hard to see how this will be seriously achieved without an increase of aid funding. At the same time the FCDO continues to have around 3,000 development staff members who have far less to do as a result of aid cuts. There is an open question around whether these staff members could be redeployed to focus on other core foreign policy priorities, including contributing to crafting a long-term strategy and working on economic development.

Similarly, if the pursuit of economic growth remains a central priority of the FCDO than it makes sense to consider rolling trade into the FCDO and creating a foreign policy department with all the levers of influence at its disposal. This would strengthen the ability of the UK to react to foreign policy events, rather than pursue the current situation where its levers of foreign policymaking are split across Whitehall departments.

Recommendation Seven: Ensure British businesses support Britain’s national interests

A responsibility of any UK Government is to promote opportunities for British businesses overseas and attract foreign direct investment, but that goes hand in hand with businesses supporting the UK’s national security and economic security. 

No government can outsource its foreign policy to the private sector, particularly to large multinational companies that are not interested in the national interests of an island of 65 million people off the coast of continental Europe. This is why the Government must ensure the state has the capacity to properly conduct foreign policy and promote businesses that adhere to the rule of law, democracy, and seek to bolster and not undermine the UK economy. 

As it stands businesses all sign up to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and many actively promote their leadership in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria. While these obligations are non-binding and are not firmly regulated, they do reflect a general acceptance by the business community that their commercial activities should not seek to actively undermine human rights and what has previously been known as the liberal international rules based order.

To this end, the UK should consider limiting membership of British chambers of commerce to majority owned British companies or UK headquartered businesses, and prioritising promoting and protecting the interests of small and medium enterprises and national champions. The UK Government should ban companies that undermine UK interests abroad from procurement opportunities. For instance this could be applied to companies that support a host country from breaching a bilateral treaty or agreement with the UK.

CONCLUSION

The current government finds itself constantly reacting to a changing geopolitical outlook which in large part is beyond its control. In some cases – not least the ‘hold your nose’ pragmatism with which they have courted the second Trump administration – decision-makers in Number 10 have navigated these choppy waters with skill and agility. What this response lacks, however, is a clearly articulated assessment of British interests which can then inform proactive policy choices. Absent this overarching vision, policy positions come and go as crisis piles upon crisis, and the prevailing sense is one of treading water rather than moving forwards towards a new destination. 

It is not inevitable that the UK remains a tributary state, a supplicant state, or a mercenary state. The only thing that makes this a self-fulfilling prophecy is if policymakers give up their agency and, out of fear of a geopolitically unstable world, stick to the doom-loop of passive triangulation. 

As with domestic policy, the UK faces a decade of difficult decisions abroad as it navigates an increasingly unstable and uncertain world. Policymakers will not be rewarded by the electorate or history for choosing the status quo over a strategy that guarantees the security and stability of the UK.

By accepting the geopolitical reality we find ourselves in and by being more honest with the public about policy trade-offs, the UK can begin to chart a course that will guarantee its economic security, national security, and prosperity throughout the next century. This starts with prioritising resilience, identifying like-minded partners, and putting in place a coherent and decades-long strategy to expand the choices we have to act autonomously and impactfully on the global stage.

To build a sense of agency and achieve its goals of security and prosperity, the UK needs a stronger sense of its medium-to long-term interests, and the positioning that will allow it to pursue these interests as effectively as possible. The pursuit of our interests does not inevitably mean a rejection of what in the past would have been called “values-based” foreign policy – in many instances our interests are best served by bolstering the principles we helped to bake into the postwar international system – but it will require a good measure of pragmatism. 

This transformation is not something that will happen overnight. It is a project that requires careful planning, strategic investments, and wise partnership-building over years. In the meantime, UK policymakers should be more honest with the public about the limited choices the UK has in the short-term, and set aside some of our pretensions regarding global leadership. We no longer rule the waves, but in a multipolar world there are ample opportunities to influence external events for the better, both in pursuit of the UK’s national interest and wider global public goods. There is much to be gained from accepting our limitations and using our constrained circumstances to make the case for a radical rethinking of our foreign policy. 

The Authors:

Sam Goodman and Ben Horton are co-chairs of the New Diplomacy Project.

Image courtesy of Flickr & FCDO photo stream.