A Strategic Partnership Agreement between the UK and Kosovo: What could it look like?

When the UK hosted the Berlin Process Western Balkans Summit last October, reference was made in the margins to a potential agreement between the UK and Kosovo. Initially, the focus was on migration. However, the latest statement by Kosovo’s President Osmani on the matter made clear that discussions with London are about a strategic partnership agreement potentially much broader in scope. Any agreement on migration certainly needs to respect international legal standards, including the European Convention on Human Rights, which forms part of Kosovo’s constitution. It is important that it reflects genuine partnership, including capacity building and investment, and that migrants’ rights are placed front and centre.

But what should be the wider elements of an agreement? Clearly, if such an agreement is to be credible and durable, it must be in the mutual interest of both parties: strengthening Kosovo’s institutions and thereby enhancing European security prospectives while also supporting growth and economic development.

 Security

Any UK–Kosovo strategic partnership need to reflect both countries’ common interest in achieving a more secure and prosperous Western Balkans region. It should also help support Kosovo on its Euro-Atlantic path and help Kosovo to become a net contributor to security. It should take full account of Kosovo’s specific security context, which cannot be separated from the wider regional and European security environment. The Western Balkans remains vulnerable to destabilisation, particularly through Russian disinformation and other hybrid activity, sometimes involving Serbia. Moscow has consistently sought to exploit unresolved regional disputes, weaken Euro-Atlantic institutions, and distract attention and resource from Ukraine.

The Banjska attack in September 2023, in which heavily armed Serb paramilitaries crossed into Kosovo, was a stark reminder that such risks are not theoretical. The attack, although frustrated by a swift Kosovo Police response, demonstrated both intent and capability. It also showed the permeability of Kosovo’s security environment. 

The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  continues to play a vital role, even though its mandate inevitably imposes limitations. Since the Banjska incident, KFOR has redoubled co-operation with both EULEX (the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) and the Kosovo Police. Its presence provides reassurance in Kosovo and is respected outside Kosovo; however, it did not deter the Banjska attack, and the perpetrators of the attack have yet to face justice. Moreover, there remains strategic ambiguity around how KFOR could respond in the event of a larger-scale incursion or sustained campaign against Kosovo’s territorial integrity.

Here, the UK is well placed to help strengthen deterrence without contributing to escalation. The 2024 UK–Ukraine bilateral security agreement provides useful pointers. That agreement commits the UK to cooperation and support to Ukraine in the event of a future armed attack. A similar formulation could apply to Kosovo. Without naming any country explicitly, the UK could commit to co-operation and support to Kosovo in the event of armed attack by any state or non-state actor, including Wagner-style proxy forces of the kind seen at Banjska.

 Beyond crisis response, security co-operation could also include:

·       Expanded UK support to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as it continues its transition into a fully-fledged, professional defence force.

·       Training, doctrine development, and interoperability to help Kosovo meet NATO standards.

·       UK advocacy for Kosovo’s eventual NATO membership, including diplomatic support with non-recognising Allies, helping to remove obstacles to progress.

Such measures would help to strengthen Kosovo’s resilience while also reinforcing stability in a region where insecurity has repeatedly spilled over into wider European crises.

Kosovo, for its part, would need to re-affirm its commitment to implementing the provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan, as reflected in Kosovo law, which underpinned recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the UK and other like-minded states. This might involve, for example, a clear plan for the inclusion of non-majority communities, notably Kosovo Serbs.

Investment and development 

Economic development is itself a stabilising force, and Kosovo’s trajectory offers tangible opportunities for UK engagement. UK Export Finance (UKEF) already has valuable experience of engagement in infrastructure projects in the region and has much to offer in Kosovo.

Kosovo’s hosting of the upcoming XXI Mediterranean Games in 2030 presents an excellent opportunity. Large-scale infrastructure requirements – including stadia, athlete villages, transport links, and associated urban regeneration – could provide openings for British construction, engineering and project management firms, working alongside other partners.

Kosovo’s need for investment in rail and road connectivity, energy infrastructure and digital systems also aligns with UK commercial strengths and UKEF priorities.Energy, in particular, provides a clear collaboration opportunity, with diversification away from carbon-intensive and geopolitically sensitive sources a shared priority.

There is also scope for cooperation in defence and security exports, as the Kosovo government seeks to further increase its defence spending, having already made significant purchases from the US, Germany and Türkiye.

For Kosovo, economic collaboration with the UK has the potential to foster quality investment and further integration into European supply chains. For the UK, Kosovo has the potential to develop into a valuable regional export market for British business. UK know-how could play a key role in helping Kosovo to foster a business environment that is more accessible and attractive to foreign investors.

A UK–Kosovo Strategic Partnership Agreement has the potential to be a model of constructive engagement: strengthening regional and European security, unlocking economic opportunity and addressing migration challenges responsibly. But success will depend on both ambition and balance. Ultimately, any agreement will not be judged by a single headline policy, but by whether it reflects the interests of both parties and establishes Kosovo as a strategic security and economic partner in its own right.

Michael Davenport – former Head of OSCE Mission to Kosovo, former British and EU Ambassador to Serbia.

Cover Image Courtesy of NATO via Flickr