It’s time for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join NATO
Background
NATO has long played an important role in the stability and security of the Western Balkans, dating from the breakup of Yugoslavia in the last decade of the 20th century. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Alliance has been involved in the security of its territory and the safety of its citizens since 1994, when NATO jets struck Bosnian Serb positions in Banja Luka and Gorazde under Operation Deny Flight. These aerial operations continued through 1995, with NATO bombing the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under Operation Deliberate Force, leading to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the war in BiH. In 2006, BiH joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and signed a security cooperation agreement the following year in March 2007. In 2018, NATO approved the activation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for BiH, with NATO and BiH signing a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Package in 2023 and agreeing on a Political Engagement Support Cell (PESC) plan the following year in 2024. Most recently, NATO and BiH agreed on the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) in October 2025, aiming to deepen defence reform and security development through 2025-2028. More generally, the majority of the Western Balkan countries are already members of NATO, including Albania & Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020). NATO maintains a significant presence in the region, supporting the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) under Operation Althea, which is considered the successor to NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Implementation Force (IFOR). NATO also plays a crucial role in Kosovo’s security and stability through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission deployed under UNSCR 1244 since 1999.
Implications for BiH
The accession of BiH to NATO can be considered one of the country's principal strategic foreign policy priorities. Due to its complex security-political environment, joining the alliance would mean iron-clad security guarantees for the country. Joining NATO would mean a strong reaffirmation of Bosnia’s territorial integrity and constitutional sovereignty. The Article 5 security guarantee would effectively deter secessionist threats in BiH, which predominantly stem from the Republika Srpska – the unitary and highly centralised second entity making up 49% of the territory. Therefore, cooperation with NATO acts as a priority in areas that will enable the adoption of command-and-control standards, communication and information systems, budget planning and distribution, resource management, training and equipment, and which will ensure internal and external interoperability, and thus a greater operational capability for carrying out the mission of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Politically, the accession of BiH to NATO would reaffirm the Dayton Accords of 1995 and the tripartite nature of BiH, deterring any threats of secession from the Bosnian Serb entity.
Milorad Dodik, who had US sanctions lifted in October 2025 and who was convicted for defying the High Representative, has pushed for the separation of the RS from BiH’s judiciary and armed forces, aiming for an independent Serbian state joined to Serbia. Russia is a key supporter of the RS, backing its aspirations for increased autonomy from Sarajevo, which aligns with Moscow’s broader policy of countering Western influence in areas it regards as crucial to its own political interests. BiH is already surrounded by NATO members on one side, making adherence to NATO relatively high in the region, bar Serbia and BiH’s Republika Srpska, which are two key areas of undisturbed Russian malign influence. Full NATO membership would mean robust security guarantees, crucial for security and political stability, which in turn would help reduce the impact of secessionist threats from the RS, backed by Serbia and Russia, on the country’s already fragile political structure.
Implications for the Western Balkans Six
Russia, through its traditional relations with Montenegro and Serbia as its Orthodox allies, has long sought to keep the Balkans under its influence. In BiH, its main goal has been to keep the country divided, dysfunctional, and unable to join Western organisations, like NATO, seeking to deprive Sarajevo of the ability to develop its own strategic foreign policy ambitions. The integration of BiH into NATO would allow for increased interoperability between NATO and the Western Balkans, with the majority of the region being members of the alliance already. The integration of BiH into NATO would mean significant benefits for the region in terms of security, stability and cooperation. NATO membership would quell secessionist ambitions and would deter hostile actors in the region, ensuring that NATO acts as the main security guarantor in the region and that its peacekeeping missions in the region, like EUFOR and KFOR, can be reinforced and supported easily and quickly. This way, Russian malign influence in the region, primarily exported by Serbia and the RS, is counteracted. Therefore, the accession of BiH to NATO, a state prone to political dysfunction, would provide significant benefits for both BiH and the region, deterring internal threats (RS secession) and wider foreign influence.
How could it be done?
Although BiH possesses a fragmented and complex political system, NATO membership continues to remain politically and legally possible. Since the end of the war and the Dayton agreement, the country has developed state-level defence institutions that have proven cooperation with NATO, even whilst significant constitutional divisions might remain between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS. Bosnian armed forces regularly participate in NATO exercises and operations, and importantly, defence policy and said Armed Forces are managed at a federal level rather than individual entities, providing NATO with a single institutional counterpart (relatively) stable.
The principal obstacle, therefore, remains the political consensus, and the deadlock from within Serb actors in the country remains the biggest threat. However, fragmentation does not make accession impossible. NATO enlargement has often been driven as much by political strategy and security concerns as by institutional perfection at the state level. Bosnia can still progress through several different ways.
Firstly, incremental integration can allow the country to open up deeper practical cooperation without full membership, including defence reforms, further interoperability, and participation in NATO-led operations. Key here is also it’s existing strengthening of its industrial capacity, which would fit clearly as a frontrunner in NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) bringing a welcome new face to the programme.
Secondly, external geopolitical pressures from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have increased the strategic interest in stabilising the Western Balkans and reducing opportunities for influence. Whether or not the US Administration exerts its own pressure, the US President should be encouraged to look at NATO as a lens for his own interest, matching the intention and reality of multilateral cooperation. With the forcible removal of the High Representative, integration into NATO can be understood as the next step for a US Administration struggling to understand where it sees BiH in the geopolitical context. This would equally undercut RS intentions to break apart the country, providing a new institutional layer that still encourages Dayton Agreement style institutional security.
Thirdly, Bosnia’s fragmented systems may paradoxically encourage such international engagement rather than preventing it. NATO and Western governments view the institutional weakness through a security lens, requiring deeper Euro-Atlantic integration rather than abandonment which hasn’t worked so far. As a result, NATO membership could be framed not just as military Alliance decision, but a mechanism for longer-term institutional stabilisation, and deterrence against further secessionist pressures. Bosnia’s unique make-up also makes it more amenable to usually blocking NATO Allies such as Türkiye, with strong investment history and interest in the country’s success.
Ultimately, BiH’s accession would depend less on achieving perfect political unity and more on reaching a minimal sustainable consensus amongst the state institutions that exist. Whilst we look towards the end of the Dayton system, slowing decision-making and enabling construction, NATO Membership could be seen as the next step for the country emerging from the 1995 agreement. Bosnia’s experience highlights that fragmented post-conflict states can still advance towards integration into the Euro-Atlantic area when international support, continuity, and strategic incentives align.
Philippe Lefevre is a Lecturer at the College of Leadership and Innovation of Buckinghamshire New University.
Diar Bala is Secretary of Labour Friends of Kosovo & WB6.