Could Serbia change tack ?
Serbia’s President, Aleksandar Vučić, forged a close alliance with former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban even before the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power in Serbia. Orban later became Vučić’s advocate and supporter in the EU, while sponsoring the Hungarian minority in Serbia and ensuring their political loyalty to the SNS. However, victory for Peter Magyar’s Tisza in April’s elections is now producing ripples in deeply polarised Serbia. Could this betoken change there too?
As he approaches the end of his second mandate as President, Vučić has consolidated his power over the institutions of government, adopting tactics of state capture only too familiar from Orban’s Hungary. He has also pressed ahead with his agenda to rein in independent media, while resisting pressure to reform the judiciary. Observers of local elections in March reported serious incidents of voter intimidation and violence. Speaking to reporters in Beijing in May, Vučić spoke of stepping down before his term ends next April. Under the constitution, he cannot stand for a third term. That does not, however, mean that he is preparing to give up power.
For the last year and a half, Vučić has faced unprecedented challenge from a student-led protest movement which has gained significant popular momentum across the country. In November 2024, a newly constructed concrete canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second city, collapsed, killing 16 people. This incident has shone a light on corruption in tender procedures, especially for Chinese-funded projects, and highlighted how political interference leads to shoddy performance with tragic results. Widespread outrage galvanised students to organise the largest nationwide protests seen in Serbia since the fall of Milošević. Feeling the heat, last year Vučić offered up his Prime Minister, who was moved across to head the SNS. However, this failed to stem the protests.
Unlike Hungary, where Magyar emerged as a credible alternative (despite his Fidesz past), Serbia’s students and opposition have shown little sign of rallying behind a single leader. Vučić and the ruling SNS have successfully exploited conflicts both within the student-led protest movement and between students and fractious opposition parties. Accused by government tabloids of being “anti-Serb” and even of being steered by Kosovo’s PM Albin Kurti, the student movement resorted to issuing a “memorandum” reasserting Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over Kosovo in strongly nationalist language. With the judiciary largely under the government’s thumb and most broadcast and all tabloid media toeing the SNS line, Vučić will be hoping to brazen out these protests, as he has done in the past.
That said, a police raid on Belgrade University in April brought the Rector out fighting. His bold speech from the rectorate balcony during the raid caught the imagination of students and opposition alike and led some to consider him as a potential challenger in forthcoming elections. A measure of this may be the fact that he has become the target for merciless lynching in the government-controlled media. In May this year some 200,000 people gathered in the second largest public protest seen in Belgrade since the fall of Milošević.
Vučić has made clear that he will not try to stay on for an unconstitutional third term. However, he has made little secret of his intention - Putin-style - to return to his former role as Prime Minister. In one scenario, this could be at the head of an SNS-dominated list in parliamentary elections, subject to identifying a loyal successor capable of winning the presidency without challenging Vučić’s authority. This may explain why Vučić has been toying in public with the idea of calling early elections this autumn. In another possible scenario he might prefer to see out his mandate next April in order to facilitate his smooth return to the PM role shortly after that. Either way, he will no doubt want to be the one to play host at next year’s EXPO 2027 in Belgrade - the subject of further controversy over questionable tenders, but very much his personal prestige project.
As a radical nationalist and ally of convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj, Aleksandar Vučić rose to power by embracing the goal of EU accession without alienating his nationalist base. Benefiting from US frustration with Serbia’s reluctance to compromise over Kosovo, he presented himself to Chancellor Merkel and other European leaders as a pragmatist convinced of the benefits of EU integration and as someone with whom they could do business in the interests of stability in the region.
Ten years on, however, Serbia is nowhere near the front of the EU accession queue. Vučić’s closeness to Moscow and attendance alongside Orban at Putin’s Victory Day parade last year have raised EU hackles, especially in Berlin and Warsaw, while Serbia looks less serious than ever about the independence of the judiciary or media freedom. A recent deal for the sale of N1 and other media outlets to the owners of Euronews casts a shadow over the future of independent broadcasting in Serbia. Equally, Serbia’s failure to hold to account political allies who planned a botched armed incursion in northern Kosovo in 2023 has contributed to an impasse in the EU-facilitated Dialogue. Unrepentant about the impact of Chinese investment, Vucic returned from his recent visit to Beijing glowing with Chinese reaffirmation of support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.
In response to Serbia’s foot-dragging on rule of law issues, the EU has announced - for the first time - the suspension of EU funding. Meanwhile, EU enlargement, which had been treading water since Croatia joined in 2013, is back on the wider political agenda. The fast-tracking of Ukraine and Moldova to candidacy has set a quicker pace in the Western Balkans. In April, for the first time since 2013, the EU set up a working group to draft a new accession treaty – for Montenegro. This step recognises Montenegro’s determination to complete rule of law reforms and make a dent in organised crime and corruption, although critics worry that these reforms are rushed and may not be sustainable.
While Albania is seen by some as another front-runner, doubts persist about the robustness of the country’s democratic institutions and whether there is sufficient political will to strengthen the rule of law. This may be what encouraged Prime Minister Edi Rama to join Vučić in February to propose a phased approach allowing countries in the waiting room to be admitted to the Single Market without meeting the EU’s tough rule of law criteria, postponing actual membership sine die.
Spooked by Serbia falling behind on the EU track in comparison to its neighbours, Vučić has further proposed that all Western Balkan countries should join the EU together. Other candidate countries see this as a ruse to hold their prospects back, while the European Commission initially poured cold water on Vučić’s proposals, pointing out that the rule of law and an independent judiciary are fundamental to the operation of the Single Market. However, some form of phased approach is now gaining favour in EU capitals sceptical about enlargement but keen to mitigate Chinese and Russian influence.
At the EU Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro this month, Chancellor Merz and President Macron proposed a new approach to enlargement providing for “gradual integration” into the EU Single Market and decision-making structures. A joint Franco-German paper argued that this would give enlargement “new momentum” and called on the Commission to present concrete and merit-based proposals.
Vučić will see this Franco-German endorsement of a phased approach as vindication of his ideas. He has always eyed the economic benefits of EU integration, so will be encouraged by the prospect that candidate countries could secure access to the Single Market before fulfilling all the criteria for accession. Challenged in Montenegro on what he expected of Vučić in this context, Merz said that Serbia must commit to the EU and end its “seesaw” politics with Russia and China. It is far from clear, however, what gradual integration with the EU will require of Serbia when it comes to the rule of law, freedom of the media and an independent judiciary, let alone with regard to Kosovo.
As the largest of the six Western Balkan countries, Serbia’s direction matters. The departure of Orban will have heartened Serbian students and citizens demanding respect for the rule of law and challenging elite links with organised crime. However, recent experience has taught them that the EU cannot be relied on for consistent support in these areas - EU flags have been notably absent from Belgrade’s large-scale protests.
United at least in their opposition to the President, the student movement put up candidates in some municipal elections this Spring, facing off orchestrated intimidation and achieving better than expected results. However, they lack both credible leadership and a shared vision as they pursue difficult discussions with the beleaguered and fractured political opposition about presenting a joint list at parliamentary elections.
Although Vučić says these should take place before the end of 2026, they will happen when he believes he stands the best chance of winning. With judicial and electoral reforms stalled and mainstream media shackled, he will be hoping to weather what amounts to the most serious challenge to his leadership to date. As he ponders the timing, opinion polls show his SNS losing support. In Hungary, strategically coordinated grassroots action by civil society networks played a major role in Tisza’s victory, providing a template for combating coercive electoral practices. It is an open question whether Serbia’s student-led opposition can yet generate a comparably united and coherent response.
Michael Davenport – former Head of OSCE Mission to Kosovo, former British and EU Ambassador to Serbia.
Cover Image Courtesy of World Economic Forum / Manuel Lopez via Flickr