The UK must understand Trump’s unilateralism if it hopes to rebuild a progressive alternative abroad
Trump 2.0 has a defining characteristic- unilateralism. Britain and the West must understand this to build a progressive alternative at home and abroad.
Trump’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, though shocking to many, was the clearest foreign policy vision he has articulated so far in his second term: unapologetic unilateralism. What is meant by unilateralism here is the United States’ unfettered ability to act as it wishes, regardless of international law, treaties, or norms. The United Kingdom and its Western allies must respond quickly by reimagining multilateralism beyond the US-centred version that has dominated the post-war era.
Many have tried to dissect Trump’s worldview and foreign policy under the slogan of ‘America First’, describing it as transactional, unpredictable, nationalist, and even isolationist. The latter term in particular has been misused when describing Trump, as what critics often mean when describing him as isolationist is that under Trump, the US has abdicated its position of global leadership. The Trump administration has repeatedly shown disdain for shared and collective values through multilateral institutions, and usually prioritises engaging with geopolitical matters that relate to direct interests of the US.
However, abdicating global leadership and prioritising US interests does not make Trump an isolationist. The specific way in which he engages with the world and attempts to shape it as one where the US can act as it wishes stems from unilateralism. Unilateralism reflects an historical US worldview advocated for by George Washington in his farewell address in 1796, when he warned against becoming involved in “permanent alliances”. Washington’s message to the world was not that the US should detach from the world, but that as an exceptional nation, it should have the manoeuvrability to engage with others as and when it wants to.
This sentiment clearly resonates with Trump, who is evidently not interested in agreements that infringe upon, in his view, US sovereignty. For example, the Trump administration has been hesitant to enter into climate change agreements when they limit energy policy options at home. Similarly, his grievances against NATO have little to do with its members not paying enough, and far more to do with the constraints that NATO’s collective security commitments put on the US being able to act unilaterally. Indeed, this specific grievance against NATO has been shared by Democrat and Republican presidents, as seen when Obama called members “free riders” after the 2011 Libya intervention. In short, Trump views commitments such as these as steps towards global government and therefore an erosion of the nation-state.
Simultaneously, Trump’s unilateralism derives from wanting to radically shape the world unimpeded, not withdrawing from it. Disengaging from global cooperation and multilateral institutions is not the same as disengaging from the world and geopolitics. Therefore, Trump’s unilateralism is equally as driven by the US having the ability to ignore and bypass what he regards as global constraints to achieve his desired goals. If Trump wants to take Canada or Greenland, for example, he believes he can because the US has the clout to do so, regardless of whether they are historical allies or not. As Washington believed, interests must permanently drive US foreign policy, not alliances. That is not to say that Trump’s unilateralist strategy will work in achieving these goals. Tariffs, another of his coercive measures, have had mixed results at best, as they appear to have pushed the emerging power of India closer to China and Russia, promising to be “partners not rivals” at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation summit. The assumption that Trump’s unilateralism will bend the world closer to the US is therefore not inevitable, and he risks emboldening a China that has engaged with the international order and institutions.
The UK must respond to Trump’s unilateralism and the destructive influence it has had domestically and internationally by undertaking the monumental challenge of rebuilding and reimagining multilateralism. Trump’s belief in unilateralism means that he looks at countries as either strong or weak, and whilst he enjoys flattery and adulation, he is happy to later criticise and humiliate those who indulge him. Labour can only get so far with flattering Trump, as he proved in New York where he both slated Britain’s environment and energy policies as well as claimed that London wants “to go under sharia law” under its mayor, Sir Sadiq Khan, less than a week after his second state visit. This suggests that Trump views the UK as weak, or at least complacent. On the other hand, he regards Vladimir Putin as strong because he too has shown that he can act unilaterally to try to take what he wants by invading Ukraine. In Trump’s dichotomous worldview, Trump therefore cruelly blames Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Ukrainians for being weak for being invaded in the first place. Britain must show resistance against this Darwinian worldview by reinvigorating global cooperation.
Small steps have been taken to build a new multilateralism, as demonstrated by the leaders of Spain, Brazil, and Chile in their ‘In Defence of Democracy’ initiative. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva warned at the UN General Assembly that “all around the world, anti-democratic forces are trying to subjugate institutions and suffocate freedoms”. However, if a new multilateralism can develop, it must begin by credibly and consistently promoting what it preaches. The contrast in the international responses to Ukraine and Gaza have undermined the rights, laws, and rules-based order that multilateralists claim to advocate for. These institutions had already been weakened by George W. Bush’s unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, the hypocrisy has empowered unilateralists like Trump and dictators like Putin to say that the sense of an international community was an illusion in the first place. They choose to paint a world based around cultural, religious, and ethnic identity rather than values. Labour should therefore seek to engage with its international counterparts such as the members of ‘In the Defence of Democracy’ to strengthen democratic values. Doing so could even advance more security-oriented objectives of curbing the influence of China by rebuilding trust with the Global South, which has felt alienated by the international community’s inconsistent response to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. A way to do this could be by considering how to build on the recognition of a Palestinian state, by bringing tangible ideas for its reconstruction through an international effort, as well as the Labour government clarifying its position on the humanitarian crisis after the UN concluded that genocide was taking place in Gaza.
Finally, promoting multilateralism and a world with a collective purpose and set of values begins at home. Labour must understand that unilateralism is becoming increasingly prevalent in the UK via Trump’s political ally, Nigel Farage, whose Reform UK party leads in the polls. Brexit was about many things, but British independence and sovereignty – unilateralism – was a significant driver of the political movement, which is still visible in debates such as the UK membership of the European Court of Human Rights. To combat it, Labour must promote its values at home first by being responsive to not only the international but also the domestic concerns of progressives in the UK. This includes Palestine as an international issue, but also the need to introduce policies to build a nation for its population to feel secure in fairly paid jobs with affordable living. Democracy promotion starts at home, and if voters feel ignored and disillusioned, then many will choose Reform. If Labour cannot persuade their own citizens of a progressive alternative, they will not persuade the world, which would only cement Trump’s worldview.
Dr Jack Clayton, SOAS University who researches US foreign policy, specialising in American exceptionalism, military intervention and the Vietnam syndrome
Cover Image Courtesy of Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street via Flickr